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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SNARR ADVERTISING, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
- vs. -
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMIS-
SION, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10808 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by Plaintiff by the filing 
of two petitions before the State Tax Commission. The 
first of these, filed February 3, 1965, petitioned for the 
refund of Sales Tax erroneously and illegally collected. 
(R. 1). The second, filed on May 21, 1965, petitioned for 
a review and correction of a Tax Commission Audit con-
cerning various aspects of Plaintiff's sales tax liability. 
(R. 5). The two petitions were consolidated by stipulation 
of the parties and the sole issue considered by the Commis-
sion and before this Court on certiorari was stipulated to 
be as follows: 
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"The sole issue to be resolved in this proceeding 
is the proprietory of imposing sales tax upon the 
receipts from advertising upon outdoor advertising 
signs and bill boards." (R. 11) 
DISPOSITION IN TAX COMMISSION 
A hearing was held before the Commission on August 
25, 1965, and the parties entered into a stipulation respect-
ing certain factual and procedural matters on February 21, 
1966. On October 25, 1966, the Commission issued its de-
cision which sustained sales taxation of outdoor advertis-
ing receipts and thus denied Petitioner's claim for refund 
and affirmed the deficiency assessment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the decision of the 
State Tax Commission as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts are contained in a stipulation (R. 
10-12) and in a transcript of hearing. (R. 13-110). There i 
has not been, in the previous proceedings in this matter, 
any particular dispute with regard to the applicable facts. 
Rather, as will appear in argument hereinafter, the differ-
ences have arisen from the interpretation, relevancy, and 
legal significance of the undisputed facts. Since sales 
taxation, as a legal proposition, must rest basically upon 
the concise facts of the transaction involved, the following 
facts concerning the nature of the plaintiff's business and 
the transactions between plaintiff and its various custo-
mers are of significance: 
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The Nature of the Plaintiff's Business. 
Plaintiff is in the outdoor advertising business. Its 
prime function is to place advertisements for its clients, 
and its business is generally restricted to the medium of 
outdoor advertising. (R. 63). This business is carried on 
throughout the western states, and, within Utah, plaintiff 
places only painted signs as opposed to posters. (R. 64). 
The plaintiff is contacted by its clients in one of two 
ways: the company wishing to advertise contacts the 
plaintiff directly (R. 77), or, plaintiff is contacted by an 
advertising agency, hired by the company wishing to ad-
vertise. (R. 77). Plaintiff employs from four to six sales-
men within this area who perform the function of meeting 
with the clients, discussing the nature of the advertising 
desired, and the type of coverage required. (R. 65). After 
the initial contacts, the advertiser is put in touch with the 
plaintiff's art department to further refine the type of 
advertising program to be employed. The art department, 
after such consultation, compiles a written presentation 
of the suggested advertising program. (R. 66). This is 
reviewed by and discussed with the client, and is subject 
to his approval. ( R. 66). After the client approves of 
the program, he signs an "art work approval" form. (R. 
200). 
The next step is the selection and acquisition, if neces-
sary, of real property locations whereon the advertising 
structures will be placed. In some instances, plaintiff may 
have under existing lease a location and sign structure 
which are suitable for the clients needs. (R. 66). In others, 
however, where no location and structure are available, the 
petitioner must acquire a suitable location and place a 
structure thereon. (R. 66). 
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The real property required for these locations is leased 
from the land owner. (R. 66). A standard lease agreement 
used by plaintiff in this regard was admitted as an exhibit. 
(R. 199). As may be observed from such lease, the term is 
for a period of years, with a right of renewal in plaintiff. 
The lease further provides that should the property in-
volved loose its advertising value, the plaintiff has the right 
to terminate the lease upon five days written notice. (R. 
199, Paragraph 5). 
After the location is selected, and acquired if neces-
sary, the advertising client inspects the location and signi-
fies his approval on a form admitted as an exhibit before 
the Tax Commission. (R. 201). After the advertising pres-
entation, the location and price have been agreed upon, 
the final agreement between the advertising client and the 
plaintiff is executed. The standard agreement used in this 
regard was admitted as an exhibit in the proceedings below. 
(R. 203). Paragraph 4 of the agreement provides that 
plaintiff must maintain the displays in good condition, and 
that the advertiser may change the display at any time 
during the term of the agreement at its expense. Under 
paragraph 5 of the agreement, plaintiff retains the right 
to move the advertising display to different locations if 
the original location looses advertising value. Moreover, 
plaintiff is required to maintain such signs at its expense. 
After the execution of the agreement, plaintiff pro-
ceeds with the painting of the advertising panel to be used, 
the construction of the sign sructure (in the event that 
there is not one available), and the placement of the 
advertising panel on the structure. During the term of the 
agreement thereafter, plaintiff maintains the displays and 
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has the right and obligation to relocate the displays on 
new locations and structures, in the event that the adver-
tising value of the original structure is diminished, such 
as by the re-routing of highways. (R. 203). 
The Cost to the Advertiser. 
Mr. Floyd Moon, Comptroller for the plaintiff, testi-
fied that the price for plaintiff's services depends upon "the 
service the particular client desires" (R. 70), but the 
criteria involved are the size of the advertisement, the 
location where the display is to be placed, and the services 
performed by the plaintiff. (R. 70). A representative 
hypothetical situation was discussed by Mr. Moon: As-
suming that a client wanted three signs in three locations, 
with the agreement to run for a four year period, Mr. Moon 
testified that a typical price would be $100.00 per month, 
or $4,800.00 over the four year period. (R. 71). Such gross 
income to plaintiff would cover all the costs associated with 
the provision of the advertising services and placement of 
the displays, and "hopefully" some profit would be left over 
at the end. Mr. Moon testified the costs involved might 
be broken down as follows: 
Materials for sign construction -------------------------------- 5% 
Labor for sign painting and construction---------------- 5% 
Positioning of sign structure ------------------------------------ 5% 
Total cost for material, labor, and positioning ________ 15% 
The remaining 85 % of the costs is broken down into a 
number of various factors including cost of the location 
paid to the landowner, cost in acquiring the location, elec-
trification and lighting of the structure, rotation of ad-
vertisements and structures from place to place in order 
to keep the advertiser's message before the traveling public, 
6 
maintenance of signs throughout the period of the agree-
ment, sales services, and artistic services. (R. 72 thr. 77). 
The typical sign structure itself, divorced from the various 
services involved, costs on the average of $100.00. (R. 77). 
This is not a significant factor in determination of the 
ultimate price, since matters such as location, length of 
service, creative services, re-location and maintenance are 
more important. (R. 78). 
The Relationship Between Plaintiff and its Clients. 
At the hearing for the Tax Commission, a number of 
plaintiff's customers testified concerning the relationship 
between themselves and plaintiff in the placement of out-
door advertising. Typical of such testimony was that of 
Mr. Glen E. Lee of Terminex Company, who is the officer 
in charge of that company's advertising program. (R. 34). 
With regard to the reason for advertising by the company, 
Mr. Lee stated as follows: 
"The purpose of it is to get our message, our 
name, before the public." 
In conjunction with this purpose, as an advertiser, Terrni-
nex does not differentiate between the various advertising 
media. In the words of Mr. Lee: 
"So far as we are concerned, we see no differ-
ence between newspaper, radio, telephone pages or 
outdoor advertising. Our purpose is to get our mes-
sage before the public. We pay for getting this done 
and in no wise have we been taxed in connection 
with any of this." (R. 35) 
Another witness, Joseph S. Francom, spoke from the 
standpoint of the advertising agency. He stated that as an 
advertising agency, his company is interested merely in 
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exposing his client's products to the public. He analyzed 
the problem as follows: 
"There is no difference as far as that is con-
cerned. The television company bills their television 
client and we lease or rent or buy from them a 
certain number of spots or programs which we use. 
The highways sign company builds a lot of high-
way signs. We don't own them. We have nothing to 
do with them as far as ownership is concerned. All 
we do is lease the privilege to use that sign for 
three years or four years, whatever the period may 
me. If the sign falls down or breaks up, that is 
their problem, not the advertisers or the advertising 
agency. All we do is lease the space." (R. 54). 
Mr. Francom further stated: 
"We have nothing to do with the property. We 
have nothing to do with the structure itself." (R. 
56). 
And, finally, Mr. Francom noted that he did not feel, as 
a client and contracting party of the Petitioner, that he 
had any proprietory interest whatsoever in the Petitioner's 
signs. (R. 61). 
To the same effect was the testimony of Mr. E. S. 
Hallem, owner of the E. S. Hallem Advertising Agency. 
(R. 92). He testified that the only interest he has in 
obtaining advertising services from any media is that the 
media will best serve the needs of his clients. He said: 
"We don't care whether it is outdoor billboards 
or television commercials. We are only interested 
in the results." 
When asked whether or not he felt that the advertiser had 
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any proprietory interest in the personal property involved 
in billboard signs, he answered as folows: 
"No, absolutely not, because when we buy a 
sign or a space in the paper we don't care how the 
thing is produced. We don't care what they do with 
it. We enter into a contract with the paper for say , 
one issue. With the outdoor people for one year or 
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three years. At the end of this time when our con- i 
tract is fulfilled and we have paid them, we don't 
care what they do with the sign. The only thing 
that we are interested in is that they maintain it 
and as Mr. Moon has testified we watch them to see 
that thev move the sign to the different locations. · 
This is their responsibility. We are not buying the ' 
sign or location. Absolutely not." 
Mr. Hallem also stated emphatically that he has no interest 
whatsoever in the cost of the sign structure involved. (R. 
96). Ra th er, he noted: 
"What I am interested in is the quality of the 
work and how they perform it, how they reproduce 
our art work. We don't care about their real estate 
problems." (R. 96). 
Of similar content was the testimon~~ of Mr. Francis 
Anderson, responsibile for the advertising of Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company. (R. 100). He stated that all he 
was interested in is seeing that tlie product was exposed 
to the public. He considered that as :t client he had no 
propriety interest whatsoever in the tangible personal prop-
erty involved in the sign structure. (R. 102). Nor did he 
consider that the cost or value of the structm·e was rele-
vant in determining the desirability of placing outdoor ad-
vertising. (R. 102). When asked if he assumed the pos-
session of the structure itself, he stated: "Oh, no." (R. 102). 
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Finally the Petitioner produced the testimony of Mr. 
Wayne C. Evans, an account executive with David W. Evans 
& Associates. He stated that there is only one advertising 
media of which the customer takes possession. This is the 
so-called "gimmick" such as fountain pens or balloons and 
the like. (R. 105). With regard to all other media, includ-
ing television, radio, newspaper, and outdoor billboards, 
he stated that his clients "never" take possession of the 
personal property or media involved ( R. 105). He also 
noted that the only purpose for the use of any of their 
media, including outdoor billboards, is "to communicate the 
idea to the maximum number of people at the minimum 
cost." And finally, with regard to possessory or proprie-
tory interest of the outdoor signs, he stated as follows: 
"We have nothing physically to do with struc-
ture or ownership matter. This is all handled by 
the outdoor company. We contract with them to 
reach a number of people through their locations and 
signs." (R. 106). 
The auditing division of the Tax Commission pro-
duced no testimony whatsoever to controvert the foregoing 
eYidence as to the nature of the transactions of plaintiff 
and its various advertising clients. 
Decision of the Tax Commission. 
After the hearing had been completed, and each of the 
parties had submitted post-hearing memoranda, the Tax 
Commission promulgated a decision under date of October 
25, 1966. The "findings of fact" of such decision (R. 204) 
consist primarily of a repetition of certain stipulated facts 
contained in the stipulation by the parties. (R. 10). There 
were no findings of facts made with regard to the critical 
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issues in this case concerning possession, use, whether or 
not the transaction involved a lease of tangible personal 
property, etc. Rather, in the "conclusions of law" (R. 205), 
the Commission simply went down the list and found as a 
matter of law that: 
(1) The painted billboards involved are "tangible per-
sonal property." 
(2) The plaintiff's clients acquire "the right of con-
tinuous possession" of the painted billboards. 
(3) Clients of plaintiff acquire "the right of continu-
ous use" of the painted billboard. 
( 4) Such transfers would be taxable if they were an 
outright sale. 
(5) In actuality, plaintiff's clients exercise a proprie-
tory interest in and a control over the billboards. 
(6) The transaction is taxable under §59-15-2 (g) 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It should be noted that the so-called "conclusions of 
law" are in actuality factual determinations of ultimate 
facts in this matter. There were no findings of fact made 
by the Commission to create a connective thread between 
the testimony and the stipulation before the commission 
to its ultimate decision. The Commission did not list its 
reasons, its theories, or its interpretation or analysis of the 
facts, but merely listed several ultimate legal conclusions. 
A petition for re-hearing was filed by plaintiff on the 
14th day of November, 1966, and was denied under date 
of December 30, 1966. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROVIDING OF ADVERTISING SP ACE 
ON A BILLBOARD IS NOT WITHIN THE LE-
GITIMATE AMBIT OF SALES TAXATION 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §59-15-
2 (g). 
Before analyzing, with particularity, the specific ad-
vertising arrangement between Plaintiff and its clients, it 
would be well to review the basic legislative and adminis-
trative framework under which the Commission here seeks 
to impose sales taxation. 
The Commission does not claim in this proceeding 
that Plaintiff actually "sells" anything to its customers, 
but attempts to come within the language of Utah Code An-
notated §59-15-2 (g) ( 1953): 
"When right to continuous possession or use 
of any article of tangible personal property is 
granted under a lease or contract and such transfer 
of possession would be taxable if an outright sale 
were made, such lease or contract shall be considered 
the sale of such article and the tax should be com-
puted and paid by the vendor upon the rentals paid." 
Statutes like this have been enacted in most states which 
have a sales tax. The purpose of such legislation, originally, 
was to plug a loophole which had developed whereby per-
sons would evade the sales tax by disguising a sale in the 
form of a "lease." Thus, for example, an automobile 
might have been "leased" for a ten year period at a "rental" 
which, in fact, constituted the sale price of the vehicle 
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amortized over a long period of time. Such subterfuge 
became sufficiently common that corrective legislation in 
the form of statutes like §59-15-2 (g) was enacted to curb 
the problem. 
Thus, in interpreting such statutes, the Courts have 
referred back to their original purpose and many have held 
that only those "leases" which create the normal incidents 
of a sale should be taxed. Bona fide rentals, not made with 
an intent to evade sales tax, have been held not to be tax-
able. See, U-Drive-Ern Service Co. 1.:. State, 204 Ark. 501, 
169 S.W.2d 584 (1943); Watson Industries v. Shaw, 235 
N.C. 203, 69 S.E.2d 505 ( 1952). 
The interpretation employed should depend ultimately 
upon the applicable legislation or regulation which, in Utah, 
leave little doubt as to the proper scope of taxation. The 
statute itself requires that the lessee receive the c·ontinuous 
possession or use of the property involved. Since it must 
be assumed that the legislature intended something by the 
use of this term, the logical conclusion is that it intended 
to tax only those alleged "leases" which, because of their 
continuous term, were tantamount to sales of the property 
involved. 
Any doubt about this has been resolved by the Tax 
Commission's regulation S-32 which provides for the tax-
ation of only those leases made "in lieu of outright sales." 
Clearly, this phraseology would limit the tax to those situ-
ations where through a "lease," a buyer obtains virtually 
all of rights of "possession" and "use" as would result from 
an outright sale. The phrase is not novel to tax legislation 
and it can only be assumed that the Commission was aware 
of the effect of including such terminology. In Universal 
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Engineering Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 256 P.2d 
1059 (Cal. 1953), for example, the Court considered a statu-
tory provision taxing leases made "in lieu of sales." In con-
struing this language, the Court concluded that only those 
leases during which the property was "substantially con-
sumed" would be taxable. This, again, results in taxing only 
"rentals" which permit the same general "possession" and 
"use" as would an outright sale. 
The only Utah case which has interpreted Utah Code 
Annotated §59-15-2 (g) deals with just a transaction. In 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 4 
Utah 2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 (1955), the Court considered a 
"lease" of signs wherein the "rental" was based upon the 
cash sales price of the sign. Moreover the sign company 
there wrote the sign off as an asset after the original term 
of the lease. This transaction had all the earmarks of a 
sale except for the passage of title, and the Court thus 
held that the transaction was taxable. We submit that this 
was a proper application of the tax to a lease made "in 
lieu of an outright sale." 
The instant case presents a factually different and 
legally distinguisable transaction. The advertising agree-
ment between Plaintiff and its customers has none of the 
aspects of a sale. Indeed, it is not even a lease, but rather 
an agreement whereby Plaintiff agrees to place the custo-
mer's message before the public. This is a wholly different 
type of a transaction - a square peg, as it were, which 
the Tax Commission has now tried to torture into the 
round hole presented by §59-15-2 (g) and Regulation S-32. 
Neither the essence nor any significant facet of the trans-
action involves the transfer of possession of tangible per-
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sonal property. The evidence on this point is plethoric 
and undisputed: 
There is no relationship between the value of the sign 
structure and the cost to the advertiser. Clearly, one at-
tribute of a lease or rental arrangement is that the cost 
to the lessee will bear a direct relationship to the value of 
the property involved - frequently fair rental value of 
an article may be determined by determining a fair interest 
rate of return on its actual value. In the instant case, how-
ever, the actual materials which go into a typical sign 
structure cost only $100.00 - with labor in preparing the 
sign and placement costs each also $100.00. The total 
cost, including labor and placement would thus be $300.00, 
yet the cost of having this space presented to the 
public for four years would be $1,600.00. (See R. 70-72). 
This demonstrates that the essence of the transaction clearly 
is not the sign structure itself - for if it were, the rental 
value for three years would be over five times the cost of 
the sign itself. Nor is the sign "consumed" during the per-
iod of the agreement - the structure and panels are re-
usable up to a period of twenty years. (R. 90). Rather, 
the evidence shows that the purpose and essence of this 
agreement is that Plaintiff agrees to display the adver-
tiser's product to a certain portion of the traveling public. 
The undisputed evidence is that the advertisers are only 
interested in getting their message before the public. (R. 
34). Mr. Wayne Evans stated, for example: 
"We contract with them (Plaintiff) to reach a 
number of people through their location and sign." 
(R. 106). 
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The various advertising witnesses were in accord that they 
had no interest whatsoever in the sign structure itself. (R. 
35, 54, 56, 61, 92, 96, 102 & 106). Their purpose in dealing 
with Plaintiff was stated to be the same as in their ar-
rangements with other advertising media such as television, 
radio, newspapers, etc. (R. 105, 92, 35). 
The comparison to other media is persuasive. With 
regard to television, newspapers, radio and billboards, the 
purpose is the same - to reach a given segment of the 
public. In each transaction there is personal property in-
volved as a means to this desired end - video tape, printer's 
mats, audio tape, copy, or a billboard structure. Such 
property is not, however, the essence of the transaction 
but merely an incidental step toward the desired results. 
Just as a doctor must use his surgical tools to cure and 
a lawyer must use law books, typewriters and paper to 
properly serve his client, so must the various advertising 
media, including Plaintiff, use personal property in serving 
their customers' needs. 
It will doubtless be argued by Defendant that the "pur-
pose" of an agreement is not relevant in determining its 
taxability. Defendant has previously illustrated this argu-
ment by stating that two persons could not agree that a 
horse is, in fact, a cow in order to evade a horse tax. We 
would agree, but submit that the keystone to any such 
analysis must be good faith. There has been no suggestion 
that Plaintiff here seeks to evade taxation by spuriously 
misnomering its transaction. To the contrary, the actual 
facts of the arrangement support and bear out the propo-
sition that is simply not a property transaction. 
16 
Another most significant fact is that there is no trans-
fer of possession of the billboard to the advertiser. This 
will be amplified in a subsequent point, but the evidence, 
in total, demonstrates unequivocally that the client receives 
no significant possessory rights or interests. To the con-
trary, the Plaintiff retains the obligations to repair, main-
tain, re-paint and re-locate the sign structure. The client 1 
merely receives a contractual right to have his message put 
before the public. 
Perhaps the clinching fact and best evidence is found 
in the Tax Commission's own regulations and actions. The 
Commission is, of course, the designated expert in interpre-
tation and administration of this state's tax structure. In 
Regulation S-65 the Commission has provided: 
"Advertising space sold in newspapers, maga-
zines, or othericise is not subject to tax. Likewise, 
charges made by advertising agencies for preparing 
and placing advertising media are charges for serv-
ice and, therefore, are not taxable." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The concluding paragraph of the Regulation provides: 
"The tax does not apply with respect to art 
work produced with the office of the advertiser or 
the advertising agency for the purpose for visualiza-
tion of any idea and the client's selection of the par-
ticular visualization he favors for use in his ·ad-
vertisements. The sale of materials to the adver-
tiser or advertising agency for producing such art 
work is subject to tax." 
The evidence undisputedly shows that Plaintiff's clients are 
purchasing "advertising space," just as would be done in a 
magazine, on the back end of a city bus, or in a newspaper. 
17 
That is the essence and totality of the agreement. Not only 
the Regulation itself but the Commission's long-standing 
interpretation thereof support this exception. Although 
§59-15-2 (g) has been in existence for some 30 years. (See, 
Laws of Utah 1935, ch. 91 §1), the first attempt by the 
Commission to tax outdoor advertising receipts did not 
occur until 1963. (R. 10). It logically follows that until 
1963, the Commission itself had considered outdoor adver-
tising receipts to be exempt under Regulation S-65. Now, 
by some unknown ledgerdemain the Commission seeks to 
reverse its long-standing interpretation, erase S-65 from 
the books, and torture §59-15-2 (g) into application. The 
Commission should not be allowed to thus disclaim its 
own Regulation and interpretation, for as has been noted 
by this Court: 
"Long compliance with an administrative rul-
ing lends strength to the proper presumption of the 
regulation's validity." Utah Concrete Products 
Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 
P.2d 408 (1942). 
Nor should the Commission be permitted to limit the obvi-
ous and accepted effect of S-65 by applying the cryptic 
doctrine of ejusdem generis to the terms "or otherwise." 
Not only would this be inconsistent with the Commission's 
past actions, but also it would contravene the equally ap-
plicable maxium that ambiguous tax measures should be 
construed in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the 
taxing authority. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 347 P.2d 179 (1959). 
A significant aspect of the Commission's action is that 
it evokes a considerable discrimination aaginst advertisers 
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vis a vis other media with which the outdoor people com-
pete. The evidence demonstrates that outdoor advertising 
is in direct competition with television, newspapers, and 
magazines. The equilibrium which has existed for many 
years when none of the media were taxed would be abruptly 
altered by the imposition of tax against only outdoor ad-
vertising. In this regard, the Commission has stipulated 
that it has not attempted to and does not now seek to 
impose a tax upon the other media. (R. 11). 
Such rank discrimination, such abrupt departure from 
30 years of uninterrupted practice, and such a clear devi-
ation from both the intent and wording of the applicable 
legislation and regulation should not be permitted by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
THE FINDING OF THE COMMISSION THAT 
CLIENTS OF PETITIONER ARE GRANTED A 
RIGHT TO CONTINUOUS POSSESSION AND 
USE OF THE OUTDOOR SIGNS IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
This matter is before this Court under the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated §59-15-14 (1953) which provides 
that review by the Court may be "both upon the law and 
the facts." Although the Court has accorded to the Tax 
Commission some latitude with respect to the determina-
tion of factual issues (See Butler v. State Tax Commission, 
14 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 52 (1962)), such latitude does not 
constitute a carte blanche by which the Commission may 
act in disregard of material facts or draw unwarranted 
conclusions from the facts before it. In all events, the Com-
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mission is bound by the applicable law and it may not make 
findings of fact which effectually alter such legislative 
framework. See Western Leather and Finding Company 
v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935), 
where this Court noted that the power vested in the Tax 
Commission "does not vest in the Commission any discre-
tion whatsoever in the matter of requiring a payment of a 
sales tax by anyone other than such as are designated in 
the act." 
Even assuming arguendo that the instant transaction 
were within the sphere and intent of §59-15-2 (g), which 
we submit it is demonstrably not, the Commission has 
erred in making certain factual findings, critical to the 
question of taxation. The foremost of these is the Com-
mission's finding concerning possession herein. As has 
been noted, the statute prescribes the following criteria for 
taxation: 
"When the right to continuous possession or 
use of any article of tangible personal property is 
granted under a lease or contract and such trans! er 
of possession would be taxable if an outright sale 
were made, such lease or contract shall be con-
sidered the sale of such article and the tax shall 
be computed and paid by the vendor or lessor on 
the rentals paid." 
The Commission, itself, in Regulation S-32, has amplified 
the need for finding of possession as follows: 
"Tax on receipts of leases and rentals applies 
when the lessee has the right to use and operate the 
tangible personal property." 
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Thus, possession is the sine qua non of taxation under §59-
15-2 (g). 
With regard to such key factors, the Commission made 
the following conclusions: 
(2) "Clients of petitioner acquire under pro-
visions of the contracts and the agreements entered 
into with petitioner the right of continuous posses-
sion of the painted billboard involved. 
(3) "Clients of petitioner acquire under the 
provisions of the contracts and agreements entered 
into with petitioner the right of continuous use of 
the painted billboard involved. 
( 5) "In the actual operation of the contracts 
and agreements involved, the clients of the petition-
er, Snarr Advertising, Inc., exercised a proprietary 
interest in and control over the painted billboards 
in question." (R. 206). (Emphasis ours.) 
It will be noted that these so called "conclusions of law" 
are essentially findings of utimate facts. It is significant 
that the decision of the Commission does not contain its 
reasons, its analysis, or its discussion of the transaction 
involved. Rather, the "conclusions" simply parrot the stat-
utory language in blunt conclusions, wholly unsupported 
by and unconnected to the evidence. 
The facts in this matter, largely undisputed, clearly 
illustrate that any connection between the evidence and 
the Commission's findings as quoted above is purely coin-
cidental. Without exception, the witnesses testified that 
as clients of plaintiff they had nothing whatsoever to do 
with the actual sign structure itself. They do not main-
tain the structure, exercise control over it, move it, paint 
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it, alter it, or deal with it in any way. Significantly, the 
advertising clients have no interest whatsoever in even 
the real property upon which the sign structures are lo-
cated. To the contrary, such property is leased directly to 
Plaintiff by the land owner, and in such lease Plaintiff is 
given the sole right to enter upon such property. (R. 199). 
Therefore, the advertising clients cannot even gain entry 
to the sign structure without committing a trespass as 
against both Plaintiff and the landowner. 
On the other hand, Plaintiff, itself, retains the con-
trol over the sign structure. Plaintiff has the obligation 
to maintain the signs, re-paint them, repair them, move 
them in the event that the original location becomes un-
desirable for advertising purposes, and Plaintiff maintains 
the sole right to go upon the real property where such signs 
are located. 
The Commission did not specify what rights of pos-
session were granted to the advertisers by Plaintiff. And 
indeed a review of the evidence, the contract (R. 203) and 
the lease agreement between the Plaintiff and the land 
owner (R. 199), compels the conclusion that there are no 
possessory rights granted to the advertiser. In light of 
the facts, and the law which will be discussed hereinafter, 
the Commission's findings evoke a nevv concept of "pos-
session" which is novel to and a perversion of several hun-
dred years of Anglo-Saxon property law. 
The only case dealing with §59-15-2 (g) is Young Elec-
tric Sign Co. 'U. State Tax Commission. This case sheds 
no light on the possession problem, however, since there 
was simply no question raised there concerning possession. 
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The taxpayer conceded that it had to pay a tax on at least 
part of the rentals received and thus conceded that pos-
session was transferred. In any event, that case is so 
variant from the instant one on the facts that it would have 
no precedential value here. The signs there were custom-
made identification signs installed on the premises of the 
customer. The contract, as previously noted, was essentially 
a sale. Thus, Young gives no assistance one way or the 
other in the instant case. 
There are, however, several cases from other jurisdic-
tions, interpreting similar statutes, to which Plaintiff would 
invite the Court's attention. A case closely in point is 
Federal Sign & Signal Company v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 
161, 174 NE2d 91 (1961), which dealt with the taxability 
of outdoor electric sign display transactions. The statute 
there imposed a sales tax on transactions in which "pos-
session ... is or is to be transferred." Similarly, the Utah 
statute refers to "a right of continuous possession" but 
also refers to "such transfer of possession" - indicating 
an actual, past-tense transfer. The sole question in Federal 
Sign was whether the transaction involved a transfer of 
possession, and the Court adopted the follmving reasoning 
of the Board of Tax Appeals: 
"In none of the appellant's transactions was 
'title' to the signs transferred. In some of its trans-
actions neither 'title' nor 'possession' of the signs 
was tr an sf erred. In the other transactions, such as 
the ones here in question, the only 'possession' that 
was transferred to the customer was the 'formal 
possession' made necessary by virtue of the fact that 
the signs were erected on real property owned or 
leased by the customer rather than on property 
owned or leased by appellant. However, by virtue of 
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the provisions of the rental agreements, the appellant 
at all times retained the 'possession' or 'custody' 
necessary to perform the maintenance on these signs 
required under the terms of the agreements. And 
the signs themselves were not used or manipulated 
in any way by the customer in the same sense that 
a rented automobile, business machine, etc., might 
be said to be so used." 
The Court thus sustained the non-taxability of the adver-
tising transaction. The advertising agreements in the in-
stant case are identical to those discussed in Federal Sign 
since Plaintiff retains the right and obligation to repair, 
maintain, and re-locate the signs as is necessary. The only 
distinction b€tween the cases is that in Federal Sign, the 
signs were located on the property of the customer in 
some instances - which, of course, would be a possessory 
right absent from the instant transaction. 
Also of pertinence is the discussion of the Supreme 
Court of Colorado in Herbertson v. Cruise, 115 Colo. 274,170 
P.2d 531 (1946) which involved exactly the same statutory 
language as we have in §59-15-2 (g). In construing the 
term "continuous possession," the Court concluded: 
"It seems apparent that the most clear cut ex-
ample of what the law is intended to reach is the 
case of the calculating machine or multigraph ma-
chine in place of the lessee's business, and super-
vised by lessor under a rental agreement covering 
a continuous (and usually a very considerable) per-
iod of time. This involves a more permanent type of 
lease than a multifarious type, renting driver-less 
cars for their varied purposes, where it might wen 
happen that thirty different persons, have the rental 
service of the same car. In the former case, the les-
see is securing the most permanent title that the 
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non-selling policy of the lessor allows him to ac-
quire." (Emphasis ours.) 
Under such reasoning and the facts of the instant case 
where the client never assumes possession, control or a 
proprietory interest in the property involved, continuous 
possession is clearly not shown. 
Of similar import is the case of Ford v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission, 285 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1955). The statute in 
that instance provided that "the term 'sale' is hereby de-
clared to mean the transfer of either the title or possession 
of tangible personal property ... " Thus, the statute re-
quires somewhat less than ours since it mentions nothing 
about "continuous" possession. The Court was called upon 
to define possession, and concluded as follows: 
"In Webster's New International Dictionary, 
Unabridged, 2nd Edition, definitions of the word 
'possession' are as follows : 
'Act or state of possession .. law. Act, 
fact, or condition of a person's having such 
control of property that he may legally enjoy 
it to the exclusion of all others having no better 
right than himself.' 
"The word 'possess' is stated as meaning 'to 
have and hold as property, to have a just right to; 
to be master of .. .' 
"Under all circumstances in its connection with 
tangible personal property, the otherwise unmodi-
fied word 'possession' clearly refers to him who has 
actual physical control of the thing and conveys a 
clear and definite meaning." (Emphasis ours.) 
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Under this rationale, in all fairness, it cannot be said that 
the advertising clients in the instant case have "actual 
physical control of a thing." 
In New York City, the sales tax statute applies to 
"any transfer of title or possession or both." The New 
York Court of Appeals, in construing this provision, has 
held that it requires the transfer of "actual, exclusive 
possession." American Locker Company v. City of New 
York, 308 NY 264, 125 NE2d 421 (1955). In the same 
case it was noted that "constructive possession" was in-
sufficient. 
A further note should be made concerning the word 
"use" as it appears in the statute. The statute requires 
"continuous possession or use," but goes on to refer to 
"such transfer of possession." It would appear that "use" 
was intended to be something not dissimilar to "possession" 
- otherwise, of course, the Legislature would have sai<i 
"such transfer of possession or use." There are relatively 
few sales tax statutes which employ the word "use" and 
we have found but one case discussing the term in this 
context. In Howitt v. Street & Smith Publications, 276 NY 
345, 12 NE 2d 435 (1938) the Court defined "use" as 
follows: 
"We believe that the ordinary interpretation 
of the word 'use' is to assert possessory interest 
in the article for some length of time ... Anything 
less than this, as merely the right to reproduce, is 
not such a use as should make the transaction tax-
able as a sale of taxable personal property." 
The Utah State Tax Commission has accorded "use" a 
similar construction in Regulation S-32 which says, in part: 
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"Tax on receipts from leases and rentals ap-
plies when the lessee has the right to use and oper-
ate the tangible personal property." 
It is submited, therefore, that the word "use" adds little to 
the term "possession" and that the two, in this context, 
have similar meanings. The mere fact that the Legislature 
used two words instead of one does not necessarily pre-
clude giving the two terms similar meanings. (See Utah 
Concrete Pr.oducts Corp. v. Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 
125 P.2d 408 (1942) where the Court construed "used" and 
"consumed" as having the same meaning even though used 
together in the statute.) Certainly the term "use" con-
templates control, and the right to consume, alter, vary or 
manipulate the article involved, such rights being demon-
strably absent here. 
Both "possession" and "use" are modified in the stat-
ute by the term "continuous." In this regard, it should 
be noted that Plaintiff's cilents do not gain any rights in 
a given structure which are "continuous" for, in all events, 
Plaintiff maintains the right to re-locate or replace any 
specific structure should its advertising value be changed. 
In summary, therefore, the facts in this case are such 
as to make the Commission's findings in this regard clearly 
unreasonable and erroneous. The Young Electric case 
clearly does not support such findings since it does not 
discuss "possession." Moreover, the cases from other juris-
dictions dealing with analogous or identical statutes do not 
in any way bolster the Commission. To the contrary, if 
"possession" and/or "use" are found to exist in this case, 
it would constitute a broader scope of taxation than has 
been sanctioned by any Court which has considered the 
problem. 
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POINT III 
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF 
AND ITS CUSTOMERS CONSTITUTES THE 
SALE OF A NON-TAXABLE SERVICE. 
Plaintiff has devoted the preceding two points of argu-
ment to the propositions that the advertising transaction 
here involved is not within the intended sphere of §59-15-
2 (g) and that, in any event, no right to possession is trans-
ferred to the customers in the transaction. Even if we 
were to assume, arguendo, that this is generally the type 
of transaction intended to be taxed and, further, that pos-
session is transferred (neither of which assumption can 
be made on the record here involved), Plaintiff nonetheless 
submits that the transaction here involves the sale of a 
non-taxable service under the previous holdings of this 
Court. 
To analyze this contention properly, it is necessary to 
view the "totality" of the transaction between Plaintiff 
and its customers. We have pointed out above that the 
purpose of the transaction is not the transfer of property, 
but the provision of an advertising service through outdoor 
signs. The parallel between outdoor signs and other adver-
tising media has also been discussed. The testimony demon-
strates that there are numerous aspects of the transaction 
which are essentially unrelated to the sign strucure itself. 
Plaintiff acquires real property for sign locations, it devel-
ops artistic ideas and advertising presentations, it arranges 
for the electrification and re-location of the signs, and it 
repairs and maintains the signs. 
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The allocation of cost involved is of key importance in 
this regard. Plaintiff's comptroller testified that the sign 
structure itself is not particularly significant in determin-
ing the cost to the customer. (R. 70). Matters such as the 
location, length of service, maintenance and acquisition 
of property were cited as being the principle criteria for 
the price charged. 
On a typical sign structure, the cost to the customer 
would run $1600 for a four year period. (R. 71). Of this 
income, approximately 15 % would be allocable to: ma-
terials ( 5 % ) , labor in painting and preparing sign ( 5 % ) 
and placement of the sign (5%). (R. 71 and 75). The re-
maining 85 % of the income is allocable to the various other 
services mentioned above. (R. 75). It is undisputed that 
services, per se, are untaxable,* as is the real property pro-
vided. As for the materials themselves, Plaintiff purchases 
its paint, lumber, nails, etc. as an ultimate consumer and 
had in the past paid a sales tax on such items at that time. 
(R. 167 - notes from a member of the auditing staff). 
This again points out the basic inconsistency in the Com-
mission's position here. The Commission has had no hesi-
tancy in collecting sales tax on the materials purchased by 
Plaintiff, nor has the Commission protested when the tax 
was paid for repairs under §59-15-4(e). Now, however, 
it seeks to have its cake and also eat it by claiming a tax 
on the entire ·proceeds from the advertising agreement -
apparently on the theory that the revenues would be greater 
than those derived from the previous method of taxation. 
Clearly, if the Commission should succeed in this question-
*With the exception of services in repair of property for which Plain-
tiff pays truces under Utah Code Ann. §59-15-4(e) (1965). 
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able effort, Plaintiff would be entitled to a refund on all 
taxes paid heretofore on either materials or repairs. 
The net result of the present arrangement is clear. The 
Commission seeks to impose a tax on 100 o/o of income not-
withstanding the facts that 85% of the income is allocable 
to non-taxable services (or services for which taxes had 
previously been paid) and 15% is allocable to the sign itself, 
with a tax already having been paid in at least 5% of 
this (prior to the audit here involved). The remaining 10% 
allocable to the sign is labor expense in painting and plac-
ing the sign, and it can be seriously questioned whether 
this is taxable in light of the fact that it can only be 
tied in with materials already taxed. 
Even giving the Commission the benefit of the doubt, 
the best that can be said is that 15 o/o of the total proceeds 
(not otherwise taxed or otherwise exempt) are arguably 
allocable to the sign structure. We submit that under the 
decisions of this Court this is insufficient to bring the 
transaction within the legitimate sphere of taxability. 
This Court has held that where the property involved 
in a transaction is merely incidental to a service rendered 
in conjunction therewith, the transaction is not taxable. 
See Young Electric Sign Company v. Utah State Tax Com-
mission, 4 Utah 2d 242,291P.2d900 (1955), Western Leath-
er and Finding Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 87 
Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935). In Young, the Court held 
that ''repair sales" were primarily services with the ma-
terials involved being "merely incidental." Thus, the trans-
action was held not to be taxable. The percentage which 
materials bore to the total income on such transaction was 
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12% (6% cost marked up 100% for retail). The Court 
discussed the matter as follows: 
"Whether this is stated one way or the other, 
the substance is the same, and our problem is to de-
termine whether these were sales of materials under 
the Act, or whether the furnishing of materials was 
merely incidental to the furnishing of services for 
which the charge to the customers was actually 
made. What the customers were obtaining from the 
companies were principally services and not goods. 
The customers did not obtain the right of possession 
or use of the sign as a result of such repair; they 
were the owners of the signs before the repairs 
were made. In our opinion, it would be unreason-
able to find under these conditions that the mater-
ials represented a substantial portion of the outlay, 
and that their use was more than merely incidental 
to the services rendered. The Commission erred in 
assessing taxes on "repair sales." 
The evidence here brings Plaintiff to a comparable per-
centage - some 15 % of income being possibly allocable to 
the sign structure. 
The Commission will no doubt argue at this juncture 
that Young Electric precludes this type of an argument 
with regard to a "lease." Plaintiff would first point out 
that Young is so vastly distinguishable from this case, to 
the extent that it deals with leases, that it has no preceden-
tial value here whatsoever: 
(a) In Young, the "lease" had all of the ear-
marks of a sale - indeed the sign itself was paid 
for during the term of the agreement and the sign 
company wrote it off as an asset. 
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(b) In Young, the price was based upon the 
fair cash value of the sign. 
( c) In Young, the percentage of materials was 
50% of the receipts. 
(d) In Young, possession was transferred. 
None of these facts apply to the instant transaction. There-
fore, the holding of Young with respect to the rental ques-
tions therein really has no application. 
In any event, Plaintiff respectfully submits that one 
aspect of the Young decision would be unsound if applied 
to the facts of this case. The Court seemed to say in Young 
that leases, as opposed to sales, may not be analyzed to 
determine whether they are in reality services, with the 
property involved being incidental thereto. Relying on the 
language in §59-15-2 (g) which provides that taxes should 
be computed upon the "rentals paid,"* the Court noted: 
"What elements enter into the charges for these 
rentals can be of no materiality." 
As noted above, such language is inapplicable here because 
of the factual differences involved. Notwithstanding this, 
Plaintiff would submit to the Court that a transaction 
sought to be taxed under §59-15-2 (g) can and should be 
exempted if it is essentially a service. Certainly, an out-
right sale incident to a service is exempt (See Young Elec-
tric v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra, and Western Lea-
ther and Finding Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
supra) and the same treatment must be accorded to a non-
*It is not clear why this should give §59-15-2(g) transactions any dif-
ferent posture than actual sales, since the ~ection dealing ~th tl~e 
latter provides for a tax to be computed on the purchase price paid 
or charged." Utah Code Ann. §59-15-4(a). 
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sale under this section. The statute, §59-15-2 (g), unequi-
vocally contemplates that sales and possession transactions 
must be treated exactly the same for tax purposes. Note 
that the statute provides that the only "leases" to be taxed 
are those which would be taxed if they were an "outright 
sale." Therefore, to discriminate against leases in any way, 
as opposed to outright sales, would be to contravene the 
clear wording of the statute itself. It follows that since 
sales are non-taxable, if merely incidental to a service, such 
should be the case with transactions under §59-15-2 (g). 
If Young were construed to hold to the contrary, it should 
be overruled. 
A more recent Utah case dealing with the "property"-
"services" distinction is McKendrick v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 (1949), where the Court 
held that the sale of artificial limbs was primarily a sale 
as opposed to a service, and taxation was sustained. The 
Court there said: 
"The exact allocation of the cost of labor and 
materials is not controlling. It is the synthesis of 
both in the finished product which determines its 
sales value." (9 Utah 2d 420). 
Thus, where the cost of materials was equal to one-half 
the cost of labor, all of which were represented in the 
final product of an artificial limb, the Court sustained 
taxation. As noted in the opinion, the same reasoning 
would apply to a pound of ore worth but a few cents but 
fashioned ultimately into hair springs for watches worth 
thousands of dollars. 
The instant case, however, is distinguishable from 
these examples, as might be best illustrated graphically: 
Labor 
Materials 
Placement of sign 
Lighting 
Repair 
Maintenance 
Re-location 
Land Acquisition 
Artistic Services 
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5%} 5% 
5% 
Creation of Advertising Ideas 
15 % represented in 
value product itself 
85 % not represented 
in final value of 
product. 
The distinction is, in the words of this Court in McKen-
drick, in "the synthesis ... in the finished product." In 
M cKendrick, in the watch spring example, and in many of 
the hypotheticals which will no doubt be employed in the 
Attorney General's Brief, the labor and services all enhance 
the basic value of the personal property and thus are an 
integral and inseparable part of it. In the instant case, 
it was noted to the contrary that the value of the sign 
structure is not enhanced by the various services for they 
are not services applied directly to the improvement of 
the property but to tangential aspects of Plaintiff's total 
advertising program. 
It is pertinent to refer again to Regulation S-65 where-
in the Tax Commission has stated that advertising space 
agreements are services rather than property and thus 
should not be taxed. For some 30 years this has been 
applied to billboards and we question the right of the Com-
mission to now reverse itself in midstream, without amend-
ment to the legislation. 
It is submitted, therefore, that as a matter of law, 
under the undisputed facts herein, the Commission erred 
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in finding that this was a lease of tangible personal prop-
erty subject to taxation. To the contrary, under the Young 
Electric decision, the instant transaction would constitute 
the sale of a non-taxable service. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Plaintiff submits respectfully that the 
decision of the Tax Commission herein should be reversed 
as a matter of law for the following reasons: 
(a) The advertising transactions here in question do 
not come within the intent or wording of Utah Code Anno-
tated, §59-15-2 (g). This is best illustrated by the nature 
of the transaction itself, by the 30 year history of non-
taxation, and by the terms of the Tax Commission's own 
regulation S-65, which clearly exempts this transaction. 
(b) That, in any event, the Commission erred in find-
ing that clients of Plaintiff are granted rights to use or 
possession of the signs involved. Even under the most favor-
able interpretation, the evidence simply does not support 
such conclusions, and the Tax Commission has thus trans-
cended its fact-finding discretion. 
(c) That the transaction between Plaintiff and its cli-
ents is essentially the sale of a service and any tangible 
personal property involved therein is merely incidental to 
such services - thus, the transaction is untaxable. 
Plaintiff submits that the action of the Commission 
herein is so demonstrably unfair and discriminatory, is so 
clearly a perversion of the legislative intent and the normal 
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legal concepts of taxation and property law, and is so abrupt 
a reversal of the Commission's long-standing practice, that 
it cannot be sanctioned by this tribunal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BEHLE, 
EV ANS & LATIMER 
By Keith E. Taylor 
and Gordon L. Roberts 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
